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Abstract 
 
Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. 
To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person’s thoughts and feelings 
about what they are looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory 
studies. In the present study, participants’ eye movements were recorded while they 
chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to 
reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, 
when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behaviour 
and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also 
guess the preference of the original observers, but were unable to identify trials which 
were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to 
infer their judgements, but also that these inferences are open to deception. #
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that responding to the gaze of others is an important, and 
perhaps critical, component of social cognition (Emery, 2000). This view holds that 
humans are adept at detecting the eyes and following their direction, and that this 
behaviour may underlie higher-order social inferences and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). In experimental studies of cognition, gaze following has largely been measured in 
individuals performing an attentional cueing paradigm (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), 
although the usefulness of such paradigms has also been called into question (Risko et al., 
2012). The present research describes a novel method for examining a crucial and 
understudied facet of social gaze processing, namely the ability to make inferences based 
on gaze location. Importantly, this method allows us to measure the behaviour of both 
parties in an interactive design which reveals how social gaze can serve a communicative 
function. We begin by placing this research in the context of experimental work in the 
cognitive sciences and recent trends in social cognitive neuroscience. 
 
1.1. The components of social gaze 
When considering the relationship between gaze processing and social behaviour, a 
distinction can be drawn between three components of social attention. 
First, there is considerable evidence that typically-developing humans 
preferentially detect and monitor the eyes of others agents. When observers view single 
faces, complex scenes or videos the eyes are looked at early and often (Birmingham & 
Kingstone, 2009; Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010; Yarbus, 1967). 
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Selecting the eyes does not seem to occur because they are high contrast or because they 
are in the centre of the head (Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009; Levy, Foulsham & 
Kingstone, 2013). Participants with autism, who show a range of impairments in social 
situations, display reduced eye contact in face-to-face situations and may also avoid 
looking at the eyes in pictures and video (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). 
This evidence implies that the eyes are fixated because of the meaning that they convey 
to the observer. 
Second, once the eyes have been selected, successfully attending in a social 
context requires gaze following. Observers must use the information from the eyes (and 
also the head and body) to calculate what is being attended.  This often results in the 
observer attending to the same location (i.e., joint attention). Milgram, Bickman and 
Berkowitz (1969) observed that pedestrians would follow the gaze of a confederate or 
group of confederates who stood on a busy street and looked upwards (see Gallup et al., 
2012, for a recent extension). Humans possess a high-contrast eye that may have evolved 
to be particularly easy to follow (Kobayashi & Koshima, 1997). Gaze following has been 
widely studied using a cueing paradigm, which demonstrates that participants 
automatically shift their attention in response to eyes pointing in a particular direction 
(Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007).  
The majority of previous research investigating social attention has focused on 
these two requirements. However, a third component of attending in a social context 
involves inferring an agent’s beliefs and feelings about what they are looking at. An 
integral part of our understanding of other people’s mental states—“theory-of-mind”—
concerns perspective taking (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 
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2010). In the context of social attention, observers may take the perspective of a gazing 
interactant in order to answer the question of why they are looking at a particular location. 
Relatively few studies have examined the attributions made after the target of gaze has 
been established. Children of 4-5 years old can infer which item an actor likes based on 
differences in gaze (Einav & Hood, 2006). The cognitive and neural mechanisms which 
support these inferences are likely present in the first year of life (Grossmann & Johnson, 
2007; Woodward, 2003). In adults, it has been demonstrated that objects which are 
looked at are better liked than those that are not looked at (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, & 
Tipper, 2006). In non-human primates, the target of gaze is used to infer social hierarchy: 
individuals who are looked at frequently are perceived as high in social status (Chance, 
1967). Children also use gaze as a cue regarding who is best to learn from in the 
environment (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012). 
 
1.2. Gaze as part of a two-way social interaction 
In the laboratory studies of gaze following discussed so far, the behaviour of a participant 
is typically measured as they respond to an image or video representation of a person’s 
eyes. Of course, an image may not capture the meaning of a real social situation because 
the people depicted cannot look back (Risko et al., 2012). In real conversation, for 
example, gaze provides not just a means of selecting pertinent information but also a 
communicative signal (e.g., regarding whose turn it is to speak next; Argyle & Cook, 
1976). Interpreting this signal may play a particular role in grounding ambiguous verbal 
utterances (e.g., Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006; Hanna & Brennan, 2007).  
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Several other recent studies confirm that the presence of a real person changes eye 
movement behaviour, and that real interactions may be sensitive to different factors. For 
example, in Gallup et al.’s (2012) study of gaze following in natural conditions, observers 
were more likely to follow gaze if they were following from behind, where they could not 
be seen. The tendency to look at faces and eyes is dramatically reduced when in a room 
with a real person, compared to an image of the same person (Laidlaw et al., 2011). 
When walking or conversing, other people are attended to differently when they can see 
you (Freeth, Foulsham & Kingstone, 2013; Foulsham, Walker & Kingstone, 2011).  In 
social cognitive neuroscience it has also been acknowledged that studying the mental and 
neural processes involved in two-way interactions is crucial. Studies of “mentalizing”, 
which ask people to use their theory of mind, typically measure cognitive processes 
“offline”: while people observe others and think about interacting with them (Schilbach 
et al., 2006). In contrast, studying “online” cognition, where participants are engaged in 
actual interactions with each other, can reveal different results in terms of brain and 
behaviour (Wilms et al., 2010). 
 
1.3. Gaze transfer in applied settings 
The research discussed so far indicates that it is important to study both the way in which 
people interpret gaze and the way in which gaze may change according to interactions 
with another person.  
One context in which this has previously been studied concerns how people can 
use explicit representations of others’ gaze. For example, Litchfield et al. (2010) 
presented novice and expert radiographers with the dynamic gaze pattern made by 
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someone searching for a nodule in a chest X-ray. The new observers, particularly the 
novices, found the search targets more quickly when viewing another person’s eye 
movements. Viewing another person’s gaze can also guide problem solving, by triggering 
shifts of attention consistent with the solution (Litchfield & Ball, 2011; Grant & Spivey, 
2003), and change biases in perceptual judgements (Wu et al., 2012). In other settings, it 
might help performance of a shared task if one could view the gaze of an interacting 
partner. For example, in Brennan et al., (2008), participants collaborating in a search task 
were sometimes shown their partners’ gaze position. These participants strategically 
changed their looking patterns, dividing their labour, and allowing them to perform better 
than solitary searchers. 
These studies presented the gaze locations of others as a model for learning, and 
demonstrate that this can be a useful tool for improving performance. However, as 
discussed recently by Muller et al., (2013), the process of interpreting a partner’s gaze 
can lead to costs as well as benefits in collaborative tasks. During a puzzle task where 
one partner knew the solution, displaying the gaze of this person induced uncertainty, 
leading to response delays and increased verbal effort relative to a condition which 
displayed the partner’s mouse cursor.  Participants in such tasks must interpret potentially 
ambiguous gaze signals, and this interpretation presumably requires an appreciation of 
why the partner is looking in this location—a theory of mind. However, although “gaze 
transfer” has been exploited in numerous studies, these studies are typically tied to 
specific applications and do not investigate the interpretation of gaze in a two-way 
interaction in detail.  
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1.4. The present study 
The present study describes a simple but novel paradigm designed to investigate both 
how people interpret gaze signals and how these signals change through social interaction. 
Specifically we aimed to 1) confirm that people can spontaneously use the target of gaze 
to make inferences about the thoughts and feelings of another person and 2) examine how 
attention can be flexibly deployed to mislead these inferences. Participants were eye-
tracked while they chose which of a set of stimuli they liked the most. While we could 
have used any task, a preference task was particularly suitable because of reported 
relationships between looking and liking (e.g., Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 
2003) and because it provided a range of idiosyncratic choices. In the second part, 
observers were shown a replay of the eye movements of the previous participant and 
asked to guess how that participant had responded during the preference task. Thus they 
were provided with information about what was being looked at and had to make an 
inference about that person’s response.  
Observers subsequently repeated the preference task but with new instructions to 
try to hide their decision from the guesser. The case of deception is an important one 
because it is requires an appreciation of another person’s (false) beliefs. There has been 
extensive interest in determining the degree to which infants and non-human primates 
practice deception (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Whiten & Byrne, 1988). Moreover, 
folk wisdom suggests that the eyes are particularly revealing during deception, causing, 
for example, poker players to wear sunglasses in the hope of masking their intentions. 
Indeed, the ability to hide ones gaze direction may have exerted evolutionary pressure on 
the development of the primate eye, causing most non-human primates to have a darkly 
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coloured sclera (Kobayashi & Koshima, 1997). The human white sclera sacrifices this 
camouflage in favour of communication. In the present study we did not require 
participants to follow gaze from the eye, but presented a gaze cursor (as used in studies of 
gaze transfer). Can we instead camouflage our preferences by changing our gaze 
behaviour? By comparing how well people are able to guess the preference response 
from eye movements in the truthful block and from the deceptive block we aimed to 
determine both whether naïve observers can intuit a response based on fixations and 
whether attention can be flexibly deployed in order to mislead. #
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty volunteers from the University of Essex community took part in the experiment 
(15 male; mean age = 27.8 years). Due to the nature of the design, which required 
participants to react to another person’s behaviour, an additional pilot participant was 
tested to provide preference responses for the first experimental participant. Their 
fixation data were not included in the analysis. #
2.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
A set of computer-generated fractals was chosen as stimuli from freely available 
collections (http://www.nahee.com/spanky/index.html). Fractals are mathematically 
derived patterns with no explicit meaning, and we therefore expected them to elicit a 
range of idiosyncratic preferences. One hundred and forty four fractals were used in total, 
!10!#
and these were randomly assigned to groups of four (see Figure 1). In each trial, four 
fractals were displayed in a 2 x 2 arrangement on a white background. 
The stimuli were presented on a 19-inch colour monitor subtending approximately 
31˚ by 24˚ at a fixed viewing distance of 60cm. Stimuli and eye tracking were controlled 
by the EyeLink system (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Canada) via Experiment Builder 
software.  Eye movements were recorded using a desktop-mounted EyeLink 1000 which 
recorded eye position from the pupil and corneal reflection at 1000Hz. Head movements 
were restricted by a chin rest. Responses were made by pressing one of four buttons on a 
gamepad. #
2.1.3. Procedure and design 
Following a 9-point eye-tracker calibration, the experiment consisted of three blocks 
(Figure 1). In each trial of the first and third block participants performed a preference 
task requiring them to choose which of the four fractals they preferred by pressing one of 
four buttons. In the intervening block, participants performed the “Guess” task, which 
required them to guess which item the previous observer had chosen. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
Each preference trial began with a central fixation point and after the onset of the 
fractals participants could take as long as they liked to make their choice. Eye movements 
were recorded throughout and the location and duration of each fixation were written to 
disk. Each preference block had 18 trials, selected at random without replacement. In the 
first block participants were told only to choose which pattern they liked the most. No 
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other instructions were given and, because at this point in the study participants were not 
aware of the other parts of the task, we consider responses in the block to represent 
natural behaviour. Thus we refer to this as the “Truth” block. 
In the final, “Lie” block, participants repeated the preference task with the 
additional instruction to deceive the next participant by “hiding your decision or 
misleading the guesser”. It was stressed that participants should still respond accurately, 
indicating which item they truly preferred. 
The eye movements recorded from each Truth and Lie trial formed the basis of 
the Guess block for the next participant. In each Guess trial observers were shown a 
replay of any eye movements before being asked to “guess which image that participant 
had chosen”. Four fractals were displayed in the same way as before and an animated 
cursor moved over the images representing the location and duration of the fixations 
made by the previous participant when viewing those images. The cursor was a red, filled 
circle with a diameter subtending approximately 1˚. Participants were given the option of 
re-playing the gaze animation as many times as they liked before making their judgement. 
The Guess block continued for 36 trials, divided equally into three conditions which were 
shown in a random, interleaved order. In the Truth and Lie conditions eye movements 
from the corresponding block of preference trials were replayed. In the third, “Control”, 
condition, no eye movements were shown. In Control trials the fractals were presented 
with the instruction that participants should make their best guess as to how the 
participant responded. Therefore, this provided a baseline measure of participants’ ability 
to guess with no extra information.  Across all participants each particular set of stimuli 
was equally likely to appear in all conditions. 
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2.2. Results 
The responses made during the Guess block were compared with the actual choice made 
by the previous participant. Thus we asked whether guessing accuracy was greater than 
chance and whether it varied between conditions. We then examined the eye movements 
made in each preference block to quantify how overt attention was moderated by the 
instruction to mislead another observer. In each case, participant means were compared 
using repeated-measures ANOVA. 
 
2.2.1. Guessing performance 
Guessing participants took an average of 6.13s (SD = 0.37s) per trial to make their 
response. This time includes the time spent playing and re-playing any eye movements 
and deciding on a guess. Although they had the option of replaying the animation, they 
tended to do this only rarely (on only 6.7% of trials, on average; SD = 3.3). Figure 2 
summarises the proportion of correct responses during the guess block. As there were 
four possible responses, a completely random guessing strategy would give 25% correct. 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
Condition had a reliable effect on accuracy, F(2,38)=16.1, p<.001, ηp2=.46. 
Guesses to trials with eye movements from the Truth block achieved a mean accuracy of 
over 60%, much higher than chance and significantly different from the other conditions 
(both ts>5, ps<.001, ds>1.2). Control trials (shown without eye movements) were 
guessed less accurately and Lie trials elicited the poorest performance (these conditions 
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were not significantly different, ps=.16). Only on Lie trials were observers unable to 
guess the previous participant’s response at a level reliably greater than chance.  
It is worth noting that guessing performance was greater than chance in the 
Control block. This indicates that participants had intuitions about which fractals were 
likely to be preferred, and that these intuitions were sometimes correct. For example, they 
may have chosen the more colourful image, or the one that they themselves would have 
picked, and thus this level of accuracy is not surprising. If we consider performance in 
Control trials as the true baseline, it is interesting that the Lie block resulted in 
performance below chance. Thus participants were able to mislead with their gaze. ##
2.2.2. Eye movements 
Participants took several seconds to make their choice during the preference block, and 
this did not differ reliably between Truth and Lie blocks (Ms = 5.3s and 5.7s, 
respectively; SDs = 0.46s and 0.41s; t(19)<1). By examining the eye movements made in 
each trial we can ask how gaze was related to the most preferred item, and how this 
relationship changed in the Lie block. We began by looking at the spatial distribution of 
fixations, before looking at the timecourse of attention.  
To examine where people looked during the preference task, we plotted all 
fixations relative to the item that was ultimately chosen (Figure 3a). Fixation coordinates 
were rotated around the centre to align all trials to a common reference frame, with the 
preferred item in the top left. From this figure, it is clear that participants modulated their 
attention in the Lie block. In Truth trials participants spent longest fixating the preferred 
item, while in Lie trials attention was distributed more evenly. 
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[FIGURE 3] 
 
To quantify these trends, we examined the proportion of fixations during the 
Truth and Lie blocks that landed on each of the items (Figure 3b). The four regions of 
interest were classified as the preferred item (chosen by that viewer during the preference 
task) or a distractor (labelled A-C, clockwise from the preferred item). In a two-way, 
repeated-measures ANOVA, there was an interaction between condition and item, 
demonstrating that items were fixated differently in Truth and Lie trials (F(3,57)=28.8, 
p<.001, ηp2=.60). In the Truth condition, there were significantly more fixations on the 
preferred item than on any of the distractors (simple main effect: F(3,17)=33.5, p<.001, 
ηp2=.85; all Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons, ts(19)>8.5, ps<.001, ds>1.9).  
In the Lie condition, fixations were distributed between the four images and the 
preferred item was looked at less often than in the Truth block (t(19)=5.9, p<.001, d=1.8). 
However, participants still showed a systematic pattern, even in the Lie trials 
(F(3,17)=15.7, p<.001, ηp2=.73). The distractor diagonally opposite the preferred item 
was looked at most frequently when trying to mislead (reliably different from the other 
distractors, both ts(19)>5.4, ps<.001, ds>1.2), and the preferred item was looked at 
slightly more often than the two other distractors (but there were no other significant 
differences: all ps>.16). These results are averaged across many trials, and so they could 
mask a variety of different misleading strategies in the Lie trials. For example, 
participants might spend a disproportionately long time on a single distractor, in order to 
falsely indicate this as their chosen item. Alternatively, they might try to look at all four 
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items more equally (e.g., spending 25% of fixations on each). On average, the most 
looked at item in the Lie trials was selected on 34% of fixations, compared to 41% in the 
Truth block (t(19)=2.9, p<.01). Thus, attention in individual trials was more evenly 
distributed in the Lie block.   
Next, we investigated the timecourse of looks towards the different items. A 
central fixation point constrained gaze to start in the centre of the display. We computed 
the proportion of subsequent fixations on each item as a function of ordinal fixation 
number. Trials ranged in length, with a mean number of 16.2 fixations per trial (SD = 
5.6) and no reliable difference between the number of fixations in each block (t(19)<1). 
Because of the variation in trial length, we calculated the gaze distribution separately for 
the last fixation, which indicates where people were fixating when they made their 
manual response. The results are shown in Figure 4. 
 
[FIGURE 4] 
 
These results mirror those of the trial overall. In the Truth block, fixations were 
biased to the preferred item. This was confirmed by an item by time ANOVA, where 
there was a main effect of item, F(3,57)=29.8, p<.001, ηp2=.61, and the pattern was clear 
even from the second fixation (i.e., following the first free saccade; Preferred item 
different from all others, ts(19) > 4.1, ps<.005, ds> 1.4). There were also significantly 
more final fixations on the preferred item than on the other fractals in the Truth trials 
(ts(19) > 4.0, ps<.005, ds> 1.3). In the Lie block, there was much less of a difference 
between fixations to the four items over the first ten fixations. There was a smaller main 
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effect of item, F(3,57)=6.0, p<.01, ηp2=.24, and the chosen item was only preferentially 
fixated on the 9th fixation (significantly different from item C, t(19) = 3.8, p=.001, d=1.2; 
no other significant Bonferonni-adjusted comparisons). As well as this slight tendency to 
fixate the ultimately preferred item, there was also a bias towards the item placed 
diagonally from it (labelled distractor “B”). Interestingly, this bias was very strong on the 
last fixation, where participants were much more likely to be looking at the diagonally 
placed distractor than at any other item (ts(19) > 2.1, ps<.05, ds> 0.8). 
 
2.2.3. Modelling inference from gaze 
The eye movement data show that participants looked more at the preferred item during 
the Truth block. This would provide a cue which the guessers could have used to infer 
preferences. To further investigate such cues, we computed a simple model to classify 
preference based on gaze using multinomial logistic regression with maximum likelihood 
estimation. The model was trained on one third of the trial data from the Truth block, 
equivalent to the trials in the Control condition. The model was then tested on the 
remaining Truth and Lie trials, just as the human guessers were. 
 The resulting model had four continuous predictor variables: the proportion of 
gaze on each of the four items. The outcome variable was the chosen item, coded A-D, 
clockwise from the top left of the display. This model was significantly better than a 
model with no predictors (χ2(12)=190.8, p<.001). Adding a nominal predictor variable 
which coded for the last item being fixated did not improve the model fit significantly. 
Inspection of the parameter estimates confirmed that the proportion of fixations on an 
item predicted the odds of that item being preferred. For example, Table 1 shows the 
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results of the multinomial logistic regression for one outcome, the choice of item B, 
compared to the reference category A. As we would expect, the proportion of fixations on 
B was a significant positive predictor of choosing this item. There was also a negative 
effect of fixations on A (the reference category), such that fixations on A made it less 
likely to choose B (and more likely A). These trends persisted across Truth trials where 
other items were chosen, with coefficients for the percentage of fixations on the chosen 
item ranging from 0.064 to 0.143 (Wald χ2s(1)>2.8, p values from .003 to .093) and odds 
ratios from 1.07 to 1.15. In the training set, classification accuracy was 74.2%. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
  
The model can be validated by comparing the model-predicted choice with both 
the actual chosen item and the guess made by the human guesser. In the test set, the 
model classified 78% of Truth trials correctly, much better than chance and also better 
than the human guessers (who guessed 62% of Truth trials, see Figure 2). The accuracy 
of model predictions and human guesses were strongly associated (χ2 test of association, 
χ2 (1) = 35.5, p<.001): they tended to get the same trials right or wrong and predicted the 
same item on 67% of Truth trials. Indeed, even when both the model and the guesser 
made an incorrect classification they made the same error in a majority of cases (62%).  
Perhaps most interesting, we can use this model, trained on data from the Truth 
trials, to predict performance in Lie trials, in the same way that the human guessers were 
asked to do. The model classifier, just like the guessers in the experiment, performed 
poorly when classifying the Lie trials. Overall, only 31% of trials were correctly 
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classified. Human and model accuracy on a trial-by-trial basis were associated (χ2 (1) = 
22.9, p<.001). The same preference was inferred by both the guessing participant and the 
statistical model on 48% of Lie trials.  
In sum, modelling the inference from gaze confirms that eye movements changed 
in the Lie condition, and that guesser accuracy and the particular errors made can be 
accounted for by a systematic response to the observed gaze behaviour. The change in 
eye movements caused lower guessing accuracy when the observer was trying to mislead. 
 
2.2.4. Preference patterns across Truth and Lie blocks 
Participants in this experiment were instructed to make their true preference choice, but 
in the Lie block they were also encouraged to mislead the later observer. It is possible 
that some participants might have not followed this instruction and moved their eyes 
normally, while giving a dishonest preference response. Moreover, because items were 
fixated differently during the Lie block, we might expect participants’ preferences to 
change. For these reasons, it is useful to consider the pattern of preference judgements in 
the two conditions. Specifically, if the preference expressed by participants is altered by 
the instructions or a change in their attention, the items that tend to be liked or disliked 
will be different in the Lie block. 
 To examine this, we asked a new and heterogeneous sample of participants to 
choose their preferred item via the crowdsourcing website Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Seventy-four respondents rated the same sets of fractals that were seen by the eyetracked 
participants. We then conducted an item analysis, comparing the likelihood that each 
fractal would be preferred in the Truth and Lie blocks and the online survey. If 
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participants were choosing likeable items, even in the Lie block, then there will be a 
positive correlation between the probability of a particular fractal being chosen in each 
data set. Conversely, if participants are misleading subsequent observers by choosing 
unlikeable items, there will be a negative correlation. 
 The correlation between the probability of a fractal being preferred in the Truth 
block and the online survey was 0.64 (p < .01), demonstrating that there was significant 
inter-observer agreement.  However, in the Lie block the same correlation was much 
weaker: r = 0.12, p = .44. On the one hand, this shows that participants in the Lie block 
did indeed choose different items. On the other hand, this correlation is not negative, so it 
does not appear to be the case that participants chose deliberately unlikable fractals.  
Importantly, the tendency to reduce gaze toward the preferred item in the Lie 
block does not seem to be caused only by the different items that were chosen. We 
repeated the eye movement analysis above, restricting it to only those trials where 
participants chose the item which was most preferred by the neutral, online raters. In 
these trials we can be more confident that the eyetracked participant’s manual response 
was a true reflection of their preference. The eye movement results remained unchanged 
in these trials, showing again that participants were most likely to look at the chosen item 
in Truth trials (on 45% of all fixations, on average), and much less likely to do so in Lie 
trials (25% of fixations). 
 #
2.3. Discussion 
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This experiment aimed to introduce a two-way social interaction into a laboratory 
experiment, allowing an investigation of how inferences can be made from eye gaze. 
Gaze following provides information about where people are attending, information that 
in our experiment was provided by the re-played fixations.  The results confirmed that 
participants in the Guess block could spontaneously use this information to infer the 
chosen item. This result is consistent with findings from developmental psychology 
(Einav & Hood, 2006), but for task and stimuli that were arguably more complex, 
abstract and dynamic. Human guesses, both correct and erroneous, could be statistically 
modelled as a response to the gaze distribution. 
Although Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants can recognise preferences 
from eye movements, the guessers’ ability to do this may have been enhanced because 
they themselves had just completed the task. Moreover, during the guess block, these 
participants did not yet know of the possibility that they were being deceived. Can 
guessers also distinguish Truths from Lies? Answering this question will give further 
insights into whether participants are using theory of mind mechanisms in this task, as 
well as into how well participants can mislead with their eyes. In Experiment 2, a new 
group of naïve guessers took part who did not have the experience of completing the 
preference task. These participants were first asked to infer the chosen item. They were 
then asked to identify Truth and Lie trials. 
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3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty volunteer students took part in exchange for payment or course credit. There 
were 12 males and participants had a mean age of 21.2 years. All the participants were 
naïve to the purpose of the experiment and had not taken part in Experiment 1. Each 
participant in this experiment was yoked to two different participants from Experiment 1, 
and across all participants all of the eye movement data was re-played in both blocks of 
Experiment 2. 
 
3.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
Participants watched replays of eye gaze in exactly the same way as during the guess 
block of Experiment 1. The same stimuli and monitor were used, but eye movements 
were not recorded in this experiment. 
 
3.1.3. Procedure and design 
At the beginning of the session, the participants were told about the preference task and 
given an example of the eye movement animations. They then completed a block of 36 
trials, under the same instructions as the Guess block in Experiment 1. Participants were 
asked to make their best judgement as to which of the four items was chosen by the 
original observer. As in Experiment 1, the 36 Guess trials comprised trials displaying eye 
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fixations from either the Truth or Lie condition, or they displayed no eye movements 
(Control condition). Condition order was randomized and interleaved. 
After completing this block, participants completed a short questionnaire which 
asked them two open-ended questions about the aim of the experiment (“What do you 
think this experiment was about?”) and their performance (“How did you make your 
judgement?”), as well as asking them to rate the difficulty of the task. Only after this 
questionnaire had been completed were participants told that there would be a second 
task. 
In the second block, it was explained that some of the time participants had been 
asked to mislead the person who was guessing. Participants then saw a second block of 
36 trial animations, all of which displayed eye movements from a participant who had 
taken part in Experiment 1 (and who was different from the source of the trials shown in 
the first block). The trials were drawn equally from the Truth and Lie blocks and shown 
in a random order. After watching each animation as many times as they wanted, 
guessers were instructed to judge 1) whether the trial was a Truth or a Lie and 2) what the 
actual preferred item had been. At the end of the experiment, guessers completed a 
second short questionnaire asking how they had made their judgements. 
 
3.2. Results 
The manual guessing responses were analysed to see how well participants could guess 
the response and condition from Experiment 1. Because the eye fixations being replayed 
were exactly the same as those in that experiment, the first question was whether the 
same pattern of guessing accuracy would be seen in a new group of naïve participants. 
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3.2.1. Block 1 guessing accuracy 
The mean proportion of trials in which participants correctly guessed the chosen fractal is 
shown in Figure 5(a). These data represent a partial replication of the findings from the 
Guess block in Experiment 1. Participants were most accurate at guessing based on Truth 
trials, and they performed at chance levels when responding to Lie or Control trials. 
There was a significant main effect of condition on guessing accuracy, F(2,38)=57.9, 
p<.001, , ηp2=.75, and accuracy in guessing Truth trials was reliably greater than in the 
other conditions (both ts(19)>8.9, ps<.001, ds>2). Lie and Control trials were not 
significantly different from each other, and neither were they different from the chance 
level of 25% accuracy (all ts(19)<1).  
 
[FIGURE 5] 
 
3.2.2. Lie detection accuracy 
In the second block, participants made a two-alternative forced choice as to whether each 
trial was a Truth or a Lie. A guessing strategy here would result in 50% accuracy. On 
average, lie detection accuracy was not significantly different from chance (one-sample t-
test against 50%, t(19)<1). Looking at the accuracy for correctly identifying Truths and 
Lies separately (Figure 5b), there was no evidence for a bias towards responding with one 
category and thus sensitivity was essentially zero. 
Participants were also asked again to guess which item the observer had chosen 
after they had made their Truth/Lie judgement. In those Truth trials which were correctly 
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recognised as such, mean guessing accuracy was 55% (SEM = 5%). While lower than the 
guessing accuracy in the first block, this remained much greater than the 1 in 4 expected 
by chance. In contrast, guessing accuracy when responding to correctly-detected Lie 
trials was no better than chance (M=25%, SEM=5%). Thus, even when Lie trials were 
correctly detected, participants were unable to overcome the deception of the original 
observer. 
 
3.2.3. Participant self-reports  
Questionnaire responses following the Guess block confirmed that participants did not 
know about the Truth/Lie instructions beforehand. Participants rated guessing the item 
chosen to be of moderate difficulty (mean rating 3.4 out of 5, where 1 was “very easy” 
and 5 was “very hard”). The most commonly reported strategies were choosing the item 
that was looked at the most (mentioned by 70% of respondents) and choosing the item 
looked at last (also stated by 70%). 
 Participants found discriminating lies more difficult (average rating, 3.7). Four 
out of 20 participants stated that they were guessing, while most others claimed to 
recognise lies where eye movements were too “quick” or “erratic”.  
 
4. General discussion 
 
The present study tested whether participants could guess the preference of another 
person based on their overt attention. In addition, it tested whether people could 
manipulate this attention to deceive an observer. 
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4.1. Making inferences from gaze 
The results confirmed that people were able to read the minds of someone in the 
preference task by watching their eye movements. Guessers shown the fixations were 
much more accurate than expected by chance. This is particularly interesting given that 
the representation of fixations was novel for all the observers and no training or feedback 
was given. The results were replicated in Experiment 2, when participants had no 
previous experience with the task. It is significant that guesses in the Truth condition also 
outperformed the control trials, where no fixations were shown. In Experiment 1, these 
control trials—blind guesses—were accurate about 40% of the time and more so than the 
¼ predicted by chance. This margin likely reflects between-subjects similarity in 
preferences: Participants could sometimes guess correctly because some fractals were 
actually more likeable. Inspection of the choices made in particular stimulus displays 
confirmed that they were idiosyncratic, which was important for our design and hence 
performance in the control condition was not even higher (as it would be if everyone had 
chosen the same item). Displaying (truthful) eye movements significantly enhanced any 
intuitions guessers had about the previous participant, in both experiments. We propose 
that the same mechanisms are used to make inferences from gaze during humans’ 
everyday social interactions. 
During Truth trials—where participants behaved naturally—the preferred item 
was fixated most frequently. This finding is in agreement with those from previous 
studies showing the link between fixations and choice (e.g., Shimojo et al., 2003). 
Detailed inspection of the timecourse of fixations in our multi-item preference task 
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showed that the bias toward the preferred item emerged early, and that it persisted, with 
final fixations also most likely to land on this item. However, most of the non-chosen 
items were also fixated at least once, confirming that participants were evaluating the 
different stimuli before making their choice. Holmes and Zanker (2012) recently reported 
that combining oculomotor measures such as those used here could successfully predict 
aesthetic preferences. Of course, the present study cannot distinguish between the 
tendency to look at items one finds aesthetically pleasant and the tendency to look at 
something one is going to choose. Models of choice such as the gaze cascade model 
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2009) and the drift-diffusion model (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011) can 
account for the bias seen towards the chosen item, and recent evidence suggests that it is 
decision processes and not aesthetic value which modulates fixation (Isham & Geng, 
2013). Importantly, the present results show that naïve participants know and can 
spontaneously use this link between gaze and choice to guide their inferences. 
 
4.2. Manipulating attention to mislead 
Regarding our second aim, there was also evidence that people could consciously change 
their eye movements in order to mislead. The large bias towards looking at the to-be-
chosen item changed to a more uniform distribution. An important question for decision-
making researchers interested in gaze is the degree to which the looking behaviour 
associated with a choice is under conscious control or reflects an automatic process. The 
present results demonstrate that gaze during the choice task was affected, top-down, by a 
change in the task instructions. 
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More specifically, behaviour in the Lie trials provides strong evidence that people 
can moderate their gaze behaviour according to the demands of the social situation—in 
this case to mislead an observer. When doing so, they decreased their looking at the 
preferred item and successfully caused a naïve observer to guess incorrectly. The ability 
to deceive is considered a hallmark of theory of mind (e.g., Leslie, 1987). Participants in 
the Lie block had to intuit how their attention was being deployed and how the guesser 
would interpret this behaviour. Further research could manipulate the feedback and 
information available to both parties—the deceiver and the guesser—in order to probe the 
theory-of-mind and perspective-taking necessary to perform the task. The simplicity of 
the current procedure makes it well suited for such investigations. For example, it has 
been proposed that adults possess two systems for performing theory-of-mind type tasks: 
a fast, inflexible system which is used by young infants and a more cognitively 
demanding but flexible system which develops later (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). The 
faster and more primitive of these systems, perhaps relying on automatization or learned 
behavioural associations, could conceivably explain the gaze interpretation shown in the 
current task. To determine this, further experiments with this paradigm could investigate 
how cognitively demanding both gaze interpretation and gaze regulation are, perhaps 
through use of a dual task. 
It is important to note that behaviour in the Lie condition did not show the same 
bias as the natural task but neither was it completely random. This confirms what the 
participants told us—that they responded with their actual preference but tried to disguise 
this choice by changing their looking behaviour. Although participants successfully 
misled the subsequent observer during the Lie block—reducing guessing performance to 
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chance levels—their eye movements still provided clues to their choice. Participants were 
not given any instructions about how to change their fixations. However, they showed a 
consistent pattern to look more often at the diagonally opposite item in the display, 
particularly on the last fixation. It is not clear why this pattern emerges. One possibility is 
that it reflects a desire to look further away from the to-be-chosen item. There was also a 
tendency to look slightly more at the preferred item, which again indicates that 
participants were not responding randomly.  
At this point, it is important to consider an alternative explanation of the change 
in guessing accuracy for Lie trials. During these trials, despite being asked to genuinely 
indicate the most preferred item, participants might have behaved normally, fixating their 
chosen item, but then deceived by indicating a different, non-preferred item with their 
manual response. It is possible that this happened on some of the trials, and this is one 
potential explanation of the fact that preferences seemed to change in the Lie block. If 
participants were acting in this way, it would still show sophisticated awareness of one’s 
own gaze position and how another party would interpret this gaze position (“I prefer X, 
but the guesser would be able to infer that by the fact that I looked at it frequently, 
therefore I better choose Y”). 
However, a deceptive manual response at the end of the Lie trials cannot provide 
a full account of the results, for several reasons. First, anecdotal self-reports from 
participants in Experiment 1 suggest that most participants were aware of changing their 
gaze behaviour during the Lie block, and not their manual response. Second, if observers 
were behaving normally during the trial and then making a deceptive response, we would 
expect eye movements during Truth and Lie trials to be the same. However, even apart 
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from the tendency to look or not look at the preferred item, there was evidence for 
different strategies in each block. Participants in the Lie block tended to focus less on one 
particular item than those in the Truth block. The non-random relationship between gaze 
and choice, even when trying to mislead, also counts against this possibility. Thirdly, 
because participants are exposing themselves to stimuli to different degrees in the Lie 
trials, preferences are likely to change relative to truthful participants. However, if we 
consider inter-observer agreement as a reflection of a “true” preference, there were still 
many Lie trials where participants chose a fractal that naïve observers agreed was most 
likeable. In these trials the eye movement results were identical in that participants 
continued to avoid looking at the chosen item. Nevertheless, future research could 
examine how gaze can be regulated in different judgement tasks, and how changes in 
looking behaviour might actually alter future choices (as in Shimojo et al., 2003). 
Much of the previous scientific interest in deception has been directed at 
improving observers’ ability to spot liars (DePaulo et al., 2003). In Experiment 2, we 
asked whether participants could detect whether the replayed eye movements came from 
a Lie or a Truth trial. Performance was statistically indistinguishable from chance, 
showing that, although they intuited the relationship between gaze and preference, 
participants could not determine the lies. There was also no sign of a “truth bias”, which 
is commonly seen when participants in lie-detection experiments are biased towards 
identifying truths (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981). Even when they did detect a 
lie, participants were unable to determine the true preference. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that the remaining systematic eye movement patterns could be used to improve guesses in 
the Lie trials. Recently eye movements, along with pupil dilation, have been touted as a 
!30!#
possible implicit sign of guilty knowledge in a lie-detection scenario (Schwedes & 
Ventura, 2012) and in game-theoretic biased-transmission tasks (Wang, Spezio & 
Camerer, 2010). For example, Schwedes and Ventura (2012) adapted the “concealed 
information test” to see whether participants asked to withhold their recognition response 
to a previously seen face would nonetheless fixate it differently. The findings showed that 
the eyes did indeed reveal recognition, making overt attention a potentially useful 
measure for detecting deception. Steptoe et al., (2010), meanwhile, showed that 
incorporating realistic eye movements into avatar-based teleconferencing makes it easier 
to decide on the truthfulness and trustworthiness of verbal statements. There are many 
other contexts where detecting deception involves the reading of subtle cues. For 
example, Sebanz and Shiffrar (2009) showed that participants could interpret the non-
verbal cues of basketball players attempting to deceive with fake passes. The current 
study suggests that such research should look at the interaction between both the “faker” 
and the judge in these, inherently social, situations. 
Humans transmit their gaze direction very clearly, unlike most primates whose 
sclera may camouflage where they are looking (Kobayashi & Kashima, 1997). In the 
current study, the selection of the eyes and following of gaze direction was not required 
and fixation location was displayed symbolically. However, the spontaneous way in 
which participants interpreted and regulated fixation, as well as previous research 
showing effective gaze transfer via a cursor, implicate gaze-following and theory-of-
mind mechanisms. Our simple paradigm could be used to test the extent to which 
interpreting a gaze cursor activates the neural structures known to be involved in more 
traditional gaze cueing tasks. Importantly, our results highlight a flipside of the human 
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ability to transmit and receive gaze cues: The eyes can also tell lies and be used to 
mislead observers. 
 
4.3. Implications 
It is clear that detecting and following eye gaze is important for behaving in a social 
context. The current study shows that, when provided with information about the focus of 
attention, participants are adept at using this information to predict preferences. However, 
they are also able to change their attention depending on the social situation and 
communicate their preferences, even when such communication is deceptive. This novel 
paradigm provides an innovative method for investigating the reading and misleading of 
inferences based on social attention. Because participants are involved in an interaction 
with the guesser, this paradigm offers rich possibilities for studying attention and 
inferences in this context  (possibilities which are limited in paradigms such as gaze 
cueing, see Risko et al., 2012). 
 The results also have implications for the use of gaze as a model in learning, 
expertise and problem solving. In several studies across different domains it has been 
shown that participants in skilled visual search tasks can improve if shown the eye 
movements of an expert (Nalanagula et al., 2006; Litchfield et al., 2010). Moreover, 
showing an expert model’s eye movements has the potential to improve learning of a 
perceptual task (van Gog & Scheiter, 2010). These studies, along with eye movement 
cued retrospective think aloud procedures, rely on observers making inferences from gaze, 
and thus the present results support their validity. Our results also emphasise that the 
model’s eye movements may change according to the socio-communicative context (e.g., 
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if they know that they are a model; See Brennan et al, 2008, for a similar insight). 
Although we have focused on how gaze can mislead, it is clear that we often regulate our 
attention in a more positive fashion in order to enhance communication. Indeed, experts 
in gaze transfer tasks may make their fixations deliberately informative, and problem 
solvers learn quicker when deliberate, “didactic” scanpaths are replayed (Litchfield & 
Ball, 2011). #
4.4. Conclusion 
The current experiments addressed two main aims. First, they demonstrate that 
participants can use the point of regard (e.g., from gaze following) to infer a participant’s 
choice or preference. Second, they show that this inference is part of a two-way 
communication in that participants can manipulate their eye movements in order to 
transmit misleading information. Experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
have frequently studied the way that individuals attend to social stimuli, but the present 
study is an example of using a more interactive design to look at bilateral gaze 
interpretation in a controlled setting. # #
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#
   
Odds ratio  
(with 95% confidence interval) 
  b (SE) Lower bound Odds ratio Upper bound 
 Intercept 2.156 (3.081) - - - 
Percentage 
of fixations 
on this item 
A -0.133 (0.048) ** 0.797 0.875 0.961 
B 0.109 (0.047) * 1.017 1.115 1.223 
C -0.065 (0.05) 0.849 0.938 1.035 
D 0.011 (0.048) 0.92 1.011 1.111 
#
Table 1. Coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression predicting one of the 
outcomes: the choice of item B relative to the reference category A.  (* p<.01, ** p<.001)  
##
 
 
Figure 1. The experimental procedure, with example stimuli. Participants chose one of 
four patterns. In Block 1, they chose the one they preferred. In Block 3 the preference 
task was repeated with the instruction to mislead the next guesser. In the intervening 
block they guessed the pattern the previous participant preferred after watching an 
animated replay of their fixations via a circular cursor which moved around the display. 
####
Figure 2. Mean guessing accuracy (plus standard errors) for trials in the three conditions 
in Experiment 1.  A chance level of 25% is indicated by the dashed line. 
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Figure 3. (a) Fixation position distributions for Truth and Lie trials. Maps show the 
fixations from all participants, with brighter points being fixated more frequently, and the 
location of the four items (the preferred item, P, and the three distractors). (b) Mean 
proportion of fixations on each item, with standard error bars. Distractors are labelled A-
C, clockwise from the preferred item  (e.g., see labels in (a)). 
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Figure 4.  The timecourse of fixations to preferred items and the distractors (labelled A-
C), for trials in the Truth and Lie blocks. Data points show the mean proportion of 
fixations in each condition across participants, along with the value for the last fixation in 
the trial. 
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Figure 5.  (a) The mean accuracy of participants in Experiment 2 when guessing which 
item was preferred. (b) The mean accuracy when identifying Truth or Lie trials. Error 
bars show +/- one standard error of the mean. Chance performance is shown by the 
horizontal dashed lines. 
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